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The Social Value of Liability Insurance
By MmviN M. BE ii*
THE "genius of the common law" has been its vitality to develop, its
ability to expand, its compassion to enfold new problems of society
within the framework of its own historical structure.
The layman turns to this marvelous machine of social engineering
to maintain certain principles of fairness. The lawyer looks to it to
provide a basis of predictability in the relations among men. We all
thus avoid the violent jolts that society would suffer if every new social
problem was answered by a sudden act of legislation, born of the heat
of the moment and very possibly sprung full grown from the draftsman's pen but without benefit of known antecedents of orderly growth.
The common law, proceeding from case to case, and not attempting
to solve all the peripheral perplexities of a problem in one inspirational
prescription, irritates the impatient and infuriates the positive. We live
in an age of such compulsive urgency that the law, like coffee, is expected to be available in the "instant" brand. But even the eager and
ofttimes impatient law student soon realizes that there is not and cannot be "instant law" in the framework of common law jurisprudence.
A bit of reflection on the disastrous results that have flowed from
twentieth century impetuosity in other of man's ventures may help us
retain or regain a proper regard for the value and necessity of preserving a last deliberate and careful procedure for regulating the relations
among all men in society.
Private insurance against the mounting catastrophies of modern
living has been hailed as one of the great social advances of a democratic society. Our nation has been inundated with advertising of the
virtues of spreading the risk of loss among many to make it possible
for the individual to bear the economic burden of adversity. The feudal
serf had no need for an insurance policy. The lord of the fief had to
care for him in sickness and for his family when death delivered him
from feudalism.
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But industrialized society has no such keeper of the weaker brothers
-so, insurance. From the five cents a week industrial policies of fifty
years ago to insurance against thermonuclear explosion damage of today, insurance has been accepted as the socially desirable method of
alleviating individual economic hardship and protecting great industries from fortuitous disaster.
Liability insurance for manufacturers of goods is everywhere accepted as a requisite of good management and common sense. The
corporate management that didn't insure the buildings against loss by
fire would surely be found personally liable to the stockholders for
their dereliction of duty.
Yet, today, there is outrage in the voices of manufacturers because
the common law has adopted, and is adapting industry's own philosophy of the social desirability of insurance to protect the individual
from loss caused by the manufacturer's defective and deleterious products. And the common law courts have been ridiculed because they
have applied this risk-spreading philosophy in a case-by-case method,
utilizing the traditional devices and theories of common law jurispru-

dence to fit this new doctrine into the common framework.
The very reason that this great law journal is devoting an entire
issue to the problem of liability insurance is that a vociferous part of
the American business community now professes shock at the law's
logical and inexorable development of the theory of liability insurance
that our business community fostered.
Law in a democratic society has always had for its basic problem
the protection of the poor and the weak. From the earliest times the
English common law protected the consumer from the seller of harmful
food products. This was done on the basis of "public policy."
"Public policy" is the court's reaction to the felt needts oFtle tines;
it is the court's reflection of the community's ideas of fairness and right.
This public policy must be fitted, in a logical manner, into the history
and stage of growth of the body of precedents and decisions upon
which the common law rests and builds. It is this latter requirement
that causes the slowness that infuriates the impatient, as it reassures
the wise who shy from revolution-industrial, atomic, political or economic.
Today, the trend to hold manufacturers and sellers liable to consumers and users for harm caused by defective and deleterious products
is assuming proportions that cause anguish in the business community.
For many years, business was protected from financial responsibility
for this destruction because of the careful, slow method of the common
law in adapting to the problems created by an industrial age. For many
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years, too, business imposed its idea of public policy on a society in
which political democracy had far outrun economic democracy.
But the common law had the tools, and many judges, in many
courts, through many decisions over the years have honed out the legal
theory of manufacturer's liability. This change in our law finds its
practical justification and social utility in the availability of liability
insurance.
Perhaps the clearest and most succinct statement of this theory has
been enunciated by Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court
in his historic concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.:'
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to
meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or
health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person insured,
and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.
It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products
having defects that are a menace to the public. If such products
nevertheless find their way into the market it is to the public interest
to place the responsibility for whatever injury they may cause upon
the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture
of the product, is responsible for its reaching the market. However
intermittently such injuries may occur and however haphazardly they
may strike, the risk of their occurrence is a constant risk and a general
one. Against such a risk there should be general and constant protection and the manufacturer is best situated to afford such protection.
Res ipsa loquitur, warranty, failure to warn and absolute liability
are trending in the law toward a coalescence. The fabricator of goods
finds that he must have more commercial protection accordingly. But
the insurance companies proclaim that the cost of premiums on some
of the old policies, as well as on the new, is pricing the protection out
of the market. Yet was this not also the same complaint with the "absolute liability" insurance tailored for the first victims of the "new"
workmen's compensation acts enacted years ago? At least, let us hope
so. Otherwise we shall be forced, alternatively, to admit that the protective bonds of our capitalist society have reached the breaking point
and we must look to other governmental structurel
Perhaps even more than with the rapidly trending law of the Four
Horsemen-warranty, res ipsa loquitur, absolute liability and failure to
warn-is the problem of the insurance industry more acutely felt in
modem science, specifically atomic insurance. No little atomic catastrophes are contemplated. Therefore, no small coverage for such event
is adequate. So, many plants today find the advent of atomic power
unavailable not because of scientific shortcomings but because the mag124 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944).
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nitude of the necessary insurance programs has been a financial deterrent. And without insurance, no plant, regardless of size, can be run
safely. It will not operate and take a chance of a catastrophe that
without insurance would mean bankruptcy.
As a corollary, the social value of insurance is that an operating
factory, smoke pouring from a smelter's tall stacks, an airplane coursing
across the sky, all, by their very act of operating (at least in this capitalistic country) assure that worker and public alike are protected
through insurance.
In war, the enemy's bombers first seek to destroy the source of their
antagonist's oil. Without this one commodity every factory must cease
its turning. Industry and the country cease to exist. In peace time in
the modern capitalistic state there is, too, the single naturally precious
commodity that is just as vital to the very existence of the state-private
liability insurance. Cease that institution and every industrial wheel,
from the watchmaker's tiny mainspring to the turbines of the power
plant, will cease its revolutions. No manufacturer, railroader, fabricator, druggist or industrialist will continue to risk his fortune.
Yet the insurance industry presents the paradox that the plaintiffs'
lawyers (who wouldn't try a liability case if there weren't liability insurance) are the very ones who are decapitating the fowl that gestates
the thing of value. These lawyers answer, "not so, it's the cost of living
and the administrative expenses that make insurance premiums sky
high, not the 'Adequate Award."'
But neither the layman nor industry nor the legislatures nor the
law will patiently listen any longer to the fixing of blame (if blame
there is) or to long rationalizations. Action, which means protection
(insurance) within price reach, they demand now. And the private
insurance industry itself is supplying the answers. It has grown with
social and industrial complexities and has come up with new forms of
insurance. It is beginning fully to appreciate that it is a business almost
completely impressed with public convenience and social value.
Private insurance's new proposals are neither completely tested nor
exhausted. They do, however, carry as much promise of vigorous
growth, adaptation, expansion and speedy protection as does the common law itself. There is the uninsured motorist policy, the installment
verdict instead of a lump sum verdict, the rehabilitation centers for the
victims of assured tort feasors established by the very companies whose
assureds were the tort feasors, the codes of ethics for adjustors, the
settlement of a cash sum to a minor traffic victim with an insurance
policy in addition for protection in case of future contingent injuries.
These are only some of the new settlements or adjustments that afford
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full protection to the injured, discharging the social obligation of the
assured.
Neither plaintiff nor defendants have fully explored the protective
possibilities of the institution of private insurance. They are just beginning to do so.
The law is ready, willing and able. It has offered discovery, pretrial, streamlined evidence and a more businesslike procedure both in
and out of court. The layman no longer can afford the Victorian luxury
of a forensic Dickens' Bleak House. He must have his award, if he is
to have it at all, contemporaneously with injury-or within the time his
credit can carry him. He feels the practical pinch of "justice delayed
is justice denied." And his award, if it is to be dignified by such objective appellation, must be adequate or commensurate with the injury
and its economic consequences, transitory or permanent. It need not
be added that if it is objectively adequate it can be neither "reward"

nor "excessive."
What must Hammurabi's druggists and doctors have thought some
4000 years ago when he decreed his "absolute liability" laws (The
malpractice surgeon treating an infected hand lost his own hand if the
surgery was errant.)? And what must the child laborers have thought
of their catastrophes in early industrial times when the legal wheel had
so turned that the defendant was fully protected unless strict fault
was proved? Probably the same such "woe is me" consideration as defendant Cutter Laboratories when the wheel again had come full turn
2
to absolute liability.
But the world didn't end with the personally cataclysmic decisions
against Hammurabi's doctors, or the maimed child laborers or Cutter
Laboratories. To each his age and each his law and each his social protection as decreed by the mores of his time.
In holding for plaintiff in warranty, plaintiff having ingested an
unwholesome foreign substance in a bottled beverage, Smith, justice of
the Michigan Supreme Court in Manzoni v. Detroit Coca Cola Bot-

tling Co. said:8
The warranty action, of ancient lineage, did not require a showing of
negligence (though a showing of negligence, of course, did not defeat
it) but it did require privity of contract. The negligence action, on the
other hand, did not require privity but it did require that the plaintiff
show a lack of due care with respect to the particular article, e.g.,
the bottle of Coca Cola in the present case. Either of these doctrines,
literally applied, gave the manufacturer a virtual immunity. As for
privity, the injured consumer and the manufacturer were contractual
2
3
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strangers, unless related by a fiction. As for negligence, the annual
output of such bottles often ran into the millions. To show the negligence of the manufacturer with respect to any particular bottle was
an impossibility.
Yet there was a problem here that required solution within the
framework of modem commercial realities. At an earlier day, the
day, in fact, when many of our precedents began to take form, commerce, as Llewellyn puts it, was "only one step removed from barter."
Sales were little more than neighborhood trades. The "manufactured"
article was a product of the local arts. It was made under the very
eyes of the person who ultimately used it. That day is long over but
the precedents linger. We need not trace the industrial development,
the rise of the factor, the employment of agents and sellers far removed, the commercial necessity that the consumer's reliance be
placed upon the product's name, or that of its maker, rather than
upon his own inspection.
Today we have no barter, no simple village shop, no personal
knowledge of the maker, of the source of his materials or of his methods of manufacture. Rather, rudely intruding upon the ancient precedents "like a belligerent wife crashing in on an assignation with a
hussy," we have the facts of modem trade and commerce, centralized
manufacturing operations in strategic areas complemented by regional
or nationwide distribution networks, accompanied by advertising and
assurances of quality directly aimed at the ultimate consumers.
The result of the operation of these forces has been a marked
change in legal theory on a wide front. The food and beverage area
is but a small subdivision of a field much more comprehensive, involving the whole topic of products liability. It ranges through areas both
of contract and tort, from the liability of the manufacturer of a defective automobile wheel, or cinder blocks to that of the seller of an
inflammable dress, or the distributor of unwholesome food or contaminated drink, or even the purveyor of a caustic perfume.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has recently given this modem
development exhaustive examination ...:
Thus the older and narrower doctrines have given way in response
to the "evergrowing pressure for protection of the consumer, coupled
with a realization that liability would not unduly inhibit the enterprise of manufacturers and that they were well placed both to profit
from its lessons and to distribute its burdens." As a result the requirement of privity has been abandoned outright in many jurisdictions
rather than by the use of fictions, thereby opening the door to the
widespread use of the warranty theory.
As tempus fugits for mortal men, so does the law keep apace. As
insurance was designed to protect mortal man, each in his age, so too
has it the capacity to keep apace.

